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Abstract
The discussion-board site 4chan has been part of the Inter-
net’s dark underbelly since its inception, and recent political
events have put it increasingly in the spotlight. In particular,
/pol/, the “Politically Incorrect” board, has been a central fig-
ure in the outlandish 2016 US election season, as it has often
been linked to the alt-right movement and its rhetoric of hate
and racism. However, 4chan remains relatively unstudied by
the scientific community: little is known about its user base,
the content it generates, and how it affects other parts of the
Web. In this paper, we start addressing this gap by analyz-
ing /pol/ along several axes, using a dataset of over 8M posts
we collected over two and a half months. First, we perform
a general characterization, showing that /pol/ users are well
distributed around the world and that 4chan’s unique features
encourage fresh discussions. We also analyze content, find-
ing, for instance, that YouTube links and hate speech are pre-
dominant on /pol/. Overall, our analysis not only provides the
first measurement study of /pol/, but also insight into online
harassment and hate speech trends in social media.
Introduction
The Web has become an increasingly impactful source for
new “culture” (Aspen Institute 2014), producing novel jar-
gon, new celebrities, and disruptive social phenomena. At
the same time, serious threats have also materialized, in-
cluding the increase in hate speech and abusive behav-
ior (Blackburn and Kwak 2014, Nobata et al. 2016). In a
way, the Internet’s global communication capabilities, as
well as the platforms built on top of them, often enable pre-
viously isolated, and possibly ostracized, members of fringe
political groups and ideologies to gather, converse, organize,
as well as execute and spread their agenda (Stein 2016).
Over the past decade, 4chan.org has emerged as one of
the most impactful generators of online culture. Created in
2003 by Christopher Poole (aka ‘moot’), and acquired by
Hiroyuki Nishimura in 2015, 4chan is an imageboard site,
built around a typical discussion bulletin-board model. An
“original poster” (OP) creates a new thread by making a
post, with a single image attached, to a board with a par-
ticular interest focus. Other users can reply, with or with-
out images, and add references to previous posts, quote
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text, etc. Its key features include anonymity, as no iden-
tity is associated with posts, and ephemerality, i.e., threads
are periodically pruned (Bernstein et al. 2011). 4chan is a
highly influential ecosystem: it gave birth not only to sig-
nificant chunks of Internet culture and memes, but also pro-
vided a highly visible platform to movements like Anony-
mous and the alt-right ideology. Although it has also led to
positive actions (e.g., catching animal abusers), it is gen-
erally considered one of the darkest corners of the In-
ternet, filled with hate speech, pornography, trolling, and
even murder confessions (Johnson and Helsel 2016). 4chan
also often acts as a platform for coordinating denial of
service attacks (Anderson 2010) and aggression on other
sites (Alfonso 2014). However, despite its influence and in-
creased media attention (Bartlett 2016, Ingram 2016), 4chan
remains largely unstudied, which motivates the need for sys-
tematic analyses of its ecosystem.
In this paper, we start addressing this gap, presenting a
longitudinal study of one sub-community, namely, /pol/, the
“Politically Incorrect” board. To some extent, /pol/ is con-
sidered a containment board, allowing generally distasteful
content – even by 4chan standards – to be discussed with-
out disturbing the operations of other boards, with many of
its posters subscribing to the alt-right and exhibiting char-
acteristics of xenophobia, social conservatism, racism, and,
generally speaking, hate. We present a multi-faceted, first-
of-its-kind analysis of /pol/, using a dataset of 8M posts from
over 216K conversation threads collected over a 2.5-month
period. First, we perform a general characterization of /pol/,
focusing on posting behavior and on how 4chan’s unique
features influence the way discussions proceed. Next, we
explore the types of content shared on /pol/, including third-
party links and images, the use of hate speech, and differ-
ences in discussion topics at the country level. Finally, we
show that /pol/’s hate-filled vitriol is not contained within
/pol/, or even 4chan, by measuring its effects on conversa-
tions taking place on other platforms, such as YouTube, via
a phenomenon called “raids.”
Contributions. In summary, this paper makes several con-
tributions. First, we provide a large scale analysis of /pol/’s
posting behavior, showing the impact of 4chan’s unique fea-
tures, that /pol/ users are spread around the world, and that,
although posters remain anonymous, /pol/ is filled with many
different voices. Next, we show that /pol/ users post many
Figure 1: Examples of typical /pol/ threads. (A) illustrates
the derogatory use of “cuck” in response to a Bernie Sanders
image; (B) a casual call for genocide with an image of a
woman’s cleavage and a “humorous” response; (C) /pol/’s
fears that a withdrawal of Hillary Clinton would guaran-
tee Trump’s loss; (D) shows Kek, the “God” of memes, via
which /pol/ “believes” they influence reality.
links to YouTube videos, tend to favor “right-wing” news
sources, and post a large amount of unique images. Finally,
we provide evidence that there are numerous instances of in-
dividual YouTube videos being “raided,” and provide a first
metric for measuring such activity.
4chan
4chan.org is an imageboard site. A user, the “original poster”
(OP), creates a new thread by posting a message, with an im-
age attached, to a board with a particular topic. Other users
can also post in the thread, with or without images, and refer
to previous posts by replying to or quoting portions of it.
Boards. As of January 2017, 4chan features 69 boards, split
into 7 high level categories, e.g., Japanese Culture (9 boards)
or Adult (13 boards). In this paper, we focus on /pol/, the
“Politically Incorrect” board. Figure 1 shows four typical
/pol/ threads. Besides the content, the figure also illustrates
the reply feature (‘¿¿12345’ is a reply to post ‘12345’), as
well as other concepts discussed below. Aiming to create a
baseline to compare /pol/ to, we also collect posts from two
other boards: “Sports” (/sp/) and “International” (/int/). The
former focuses on sports and athletics, the latter on cultures,
languages, etc. We choose these two since they are consid-
ered “safe-for-work” boards, and are, according to 4chan
rules, more heavily moderated, but also because they display
the country flag of the OP, which we discuss next.
Anonymity. Users do not need an account to read/write
posts. Anonymity is the default (and preferred) behavior, but
users can enter a name along with their posts, even though
they can change it with each post if they wish. Naturally,
anonymity here is meant to be with respect to other users, not
the site or the authorities, unless using Tor or similar tools.
Tripcodes (hashes of user-supplied passwords) can be used
to “link” threads from the same user across time, providing a
way to verify pseudo-identity. On some boards, intra-thread
trolling led to the introduction of poster IDs. Within a thread
(and only that thread), each poster is given a unique ID that
appears along with their post, using a combination of cook-
ies and IP tracking. This preserves anonymity, but mitigates
low-effort sock puppeteering. To the best of our knowledge,
/pol/ is currently the only board with poster IDs enabled.
Flags. /pol/, /sp/, and /int/ also include, along with each post,
the flag of the country the user posted from, based on IP geo-
location. This is meant to reduce the ability to “troll” users
by, e.g., claiming to be from a country where an event is
happening (even though geo-location can obviously be ma-
nipulated using VPNs and proxies).
Ephemerality. Each board has a finite catalog of threads.
Threads are pruned after a relatively short period of time via
a “bumping system.” Threads with the most recent post ap-
pear first, and creating a new thread results in the one with
the least recent post getting removed. A post in a thread
keeps it alive by bumping it up, however, to prevent a thread
from never getting purged, 4chan implements bump and im-
age limits. After a thread is bumped N times or has M im-
ages posted to it (with N and M being board-dependent),
new posts will no longer bump it up. Originally, when a
thread fell out of the catalog, it was permanently gone, how-
ever, an archive system for a subset of boards has recently
been implemented: once a thread is purged, its final state
is archived for a relatively short period of time – currently
seven days.
Moderation. 4chan’s moderation policy is generally lax, es-
pecially on /pol/. So-called janitors, volunteers periodically
recruited from the user base, can prune posts and threads,
as well as recommend users to be banned by more “senior”
4chan employees. Generally speaking, although janitors are
not well respected by 4chan users and are often mocked for
their perceived love for power, they do contribute to 4chan’s
continuing operation, by volunteering work on a site that is
somewhat struggling to stay solvent (Wolf 2016).
Related Work
While 4chan constantly attracts considerable interest in the
popular press (Bartlett 2016, Ingram 2016), there is very lit-
tle scientific work analyzing its ecosystem. To the best of
our knowledge, the only measurement of 4chan is the work
by (Bernstein et al. 2011), who study the “random” board
on 4chan (/b/), the original and most active board. Using
a dataset of 5.5M posts from almost 500K threads col-
lected over a two-week period, they focus on analyzing the
anonymity and ephemerality characteristics of 4chan. They
find that over 90% of posts are made by anonymous users,
and, similar to our findings, that the “bump” system affects
threads’ evolution, as the median lifetime of a /b/ thread is
only 3.9mins (and 9.1mins on average). Our work differs
from (Bernstein et al. 2011) in several aspects. First, their
study is focused on one board (/b/) in a self-contained fash-
ion, while we also measure how /pol/ affects the rest of the
Web (e.g., via raids). Second, their content analysis is pri-
marily limited to a typology of thread types. Via manual la-
beling of a small sample, they determined that 7% of posts
on /b/ are a “call for action,” which includes raiding behav-
ior. In contrast, our analysis goes deeper, looking at post
contents and raiding in a quantitative manner. Finally, us-
ing some of the features unique to /pol/, /int/, and /sp/, we
are also able to get a glimpse of 4chan’s user demographics,
which is only speculated about in (Bernstein et al. 2011).
(Potapova and Gordeev 2015) analyze the influence of
anonymity on aggression and obscene lexicon by com-
paring a few anonymous forums and social networks.
They focus on Russian-language platforms, and also
include 2M words from 4chan, finding no correla-
tion between anonymity and aggression. In follow-up
work (Potapova and Gordeev 2016), 4chan posts are also
used to evaluate automatic verbal aggression detection tools.
Other researchers have also analyzed social media plat-
forms, besides 4chan, characterized by (semi-)anonymity
and/or ephemerality. (Correa et al. 2015) study the differ-
ences between content posted on anonymous and non-
anonymous social media, showing that linguistic differences
between Whisper posts (anonymous) and Twitter (non-
anonymous) are significant, and they train classifiers to dis-
criminate them (with 73% accuracy). (Peddinti et al. 2014)
analyze users’ anonymity choices during their activity on
Quora, identifying categories of questions for which users
are more likely to seek anonymity. They also perform an
analysis of Twitter to study the prevalence and behavior of
so-called “anonymous” and “identifiable” users, as classified
by Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, and find a correlation
between content sensitivity and a user’s choice to be anony-
mous. (Hosseinmardi et al. 2014) analyze user behavior on
Ask.fm by building an “interaction graph” between 30K pro-
files. They characterize users in terms of positive/negative
behavior and in-degree/out-degree, and analyze the relation-
ships between these factors.
Another line of work focuses on detecting hate
speech. (Djuric et al. 2015) propose a word em-
bedding based detection tool for hate speech on
Yahoo Finance. (Nobata et al. 2016) also perform
hate speech detection on Yahoo Finance and News
data, using a supervised classification methodology.
(Cheng, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and Leskovec 2015)
characterize anti-social behavior in comments sections of
a few popular websites and predict accounts on those sites
that will exhibit anti-social behavior. Although we observe
some similar behavior from /pol/ users, our work is focused
more on understanding the platform and organization of
semi-organized campaigns of anti-social behavior, rather
than identifying particular users exhibiting such behavior.
/pol/ /sp/ /int/ Total
Threads 216,783 14,402 24,873 256,058
Posts 8,284,823 1,189,736 1,418,566 10,893,125
Table 1: Number of threads and posts crawled for each
board.
Datasets
On June 30, 2016, we started crawling 4chan using its JSON
API.1 We retrieve /pol/’s thread catalog every 5 minutes and
compare the threads that are currently live to those in the
previously obtained catalog. For each thread that has been
purged, we retrieve a full copy from 4chan’s archive, which
allows us to obtain the full/final contents of a thread. For
each post in a thread, the API returns, among other things,
the post’s number, its author (e.g., “Anonymous”), times-
tamp, and contents of the post (escaped HTML). Although
our crawler does not save images, the API also includes im-
age metadata, e.g., the name the image is uploaded with,
dimensions (width and height), file size, and an MD5 hash
of the image. On August 6, 2016 we also started crawling
/sp/, 4chan’s sports board, and on August 10, 2016 /int/, the
international board. Table 1 provides a high level overview
of our datasets. We note that for about 6% of the threads, the
crawler gets a 404 error: from a manual inspection, it seems
that this is due to “janitors” (i.e., volunteer moderators) re-
moving threads for violating rules.
The analysis presented in this paper considers data
crawled until September 12, 2016, except for the raids anal-
ysis presented later on, where we considered threads and
YouTube comments up to Sept. 25. We also use a set of
60,040,275 tweets from Sept. 18 to Oct. 5, 2016 for a brief
comparison in hate speech usage. We note that our datasets
are available to other researchers upon request.
Ethical considerations. Our study has obtained approval
by the designated ethics officer at UCL. We note that
4chan posts are typically anonymous, however, analysis
of the activity generated by links on 4chan to other ser-
vices could be potentially used to de-anonymize users.
To this end, we have followed standard ethical guide-
lines (Rivers and Lewis 2014), and encrypted data at rest,
while making no attempt to de-anonymize users. We are also
aware that content posted on /pol/ is often highly offensive,
however, we do not censor content in order to provide a com-
prehensive analysis of /pol/, but warn readers that the rest of
this paper features language likely to be upsetting.
General Characterization
Posting Activity in /pol/
Our first step is a high-level examination of posting activity.
In Figure 2, we plot the average number of new threads cre-
ated per hour of the week, showing that /pol/ users create one
order of magnitude more threads than /int/ and /sp/ users at
nearly all hours of the day. Then, Figure 3 reports the num-
ber of new threads created per country, normalized by the
country’s Internet-using population.2 Although the US dom-
1https://github.com/4chan/4chan-API
2Obtained from http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/
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Figure 2: Avg. number of new threads per hour of the week.
4.64e−08 0.000506
Figure 3: Heat map of the number of new /pol/ threads cre-
ated per country, normalized by Internet-using population.
The darker the country, the more participation in /pol/ it has,
relative to its real-world Internet using population.
inates in total thread creation (visible by the timing of the
diurnal patterns from Figure 2), the top 5 countries in terms
of threads per capita are New Zealand, Canada, Ireland, Fin-
land, and Australia. 4chan is primarily an English speaking
board, and indeed nearly every post on /pol/ is in English,
but we still find that many non-English speaking countries
– e.g., France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and several East-
ern European countries – are represented. This suggests that
although /pol/ is considered an “ideological backwater,” it is
surprisingly diverse in terms of international participation.
Next, in Figure 4, we plot the distribution of the num-
ber of posts per thread on /pol/, /int/, and /sp/, reporting both
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the com-
plementary CDF (CCDF). All three boards are skewed to
the right, exhibiting quite different means (38.4, 57.1, and
82.9 for /pol/, /int/, and /sp/, respectively) and medians (7.0,
12.0, 12.0) – i.e., there are a few threads with a substan-
tially higher number of posts. One likely explanation for the
average length of /sp/ threads being larger is that users on
/sp/ make “game threads” where they discuss a professional
sports game live, while it is being played. The effects of the
bump limit are evident on all three boards. The bump limit
is designed to ensure that fresh content is always available,
and Figure 4 demonstrates this: extremely popular threads
have their lives cut short earlier than the overall distribution
would imply and are eventually purged.
We then investigate how much content actually violates
the rules of the board. In Figure 5, we plot the CDF of the
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Figure 4: Distributions of the number of posts per thread on
/pol/, /int/, and /sp/. We plot both the CDF and CCDF to
show both typical threads as well as threads that reach the
bump limit. Note that the bump limit for /pol/ and /int/ is
300 at the time of this writing, while for /sp/ it is 500.
maximum number of posts per thread observed via the /pol/
catalog, but for which we later receive a 404 error when re-
trieving the archived version – i.e., threads that have been
deleted by a janitor or moved to another board. Surprisingly,
there are many “popular” threads that are deleted, as the me-
dian number of posts in a deleted /pol/ thread is around 20, as
opposed to 7 for the threads that are successfully archived.
For /int/, the median number of posts in a deleted thread (5)
is appreciably lower than in archived threads (12). This dif-
ference is likely due to: 1) /int/ moving much slower than
/pol/, so there is enough time to delete threads before they
become overly popular, and/or 2) /pol/’s relatively lax mod-
eration policy, which allows borderline threads to generate
many posts before they end up “officially” violating the rules
of the board.
Tripcodes, Poster IDs, and Replies
Next, we aim to shed light on 4chan’s user base. This task is
not trivial, since, due to the site’s anonymous and ephemeral
nature, it is hard to build a unified network of user interac-
tions. However, we leverage 4chan’s pseudo-identifying at-
tributes – i.e., the use of tripcodes and poster IDs – to provide
an overview of both micro-level interactions and individual
poster behavior over time.
Overall, we find 188,849 posts with a tripcode attached
across /pol/ (128,839 posts), /sp/ (42,431), and /int/ (17,578)
– out of the 10.89M total posts in our dataset (Table 1).
Note that unique tripcodes do not necessarily correspond to
unique users, since users can use any number of tripcodes.
Figure 6 plots the CDF of posts per unique tripcode, for each
of the three boards, showing that the median and mean are
6.50 and 36.08, respectively. We observe that 25% of trip-
codes (over 30% on /int/) are only used once, and that, al-
though /pol/ has many more posts overall, /sp/ has more ac-
tive “tripcode users” – about 17% of tripcodes on /sp/ are
associated to at least 100 posts, compared to about 7% on
/pol/.
Arguably, the closest we can get to estimating how unique
users are engaged in 4chan threads is via poster IDs. Unfor-
tunately, these are not available from the JSON API once a
thread is archived, and we decided to use them only a few
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Figure 5: CDF of the number of posts for
non-archived threads (i.e., likely deleted).
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Figure 7: CCDF of the number of unique
posters per thread.
weeks into our data collection. However, since the HTML
version of archived threads does include poster IDs, we
started collecting HTML on August 17, 2016, obtaining it
for the last 72,725 (33%) threads in our dataset.
Figure 7 plots the CCDF of the number of unique users
per /pol/ thread, broken up into threads that reached the bump
limit and those that did not. The median and mean number
of unique posters in threads that reached the bump limit was
134.0 and 139.6, respectively. For typical threads (those that
did not reach the bump limit), the median and mean is much
lower – i.e., 5.0 and 14.76 unique posters per thread. This
shows that, even though 4chan is anonymous, the most pop-
ular threads have “many voices.” Also recall that, in 4chan,
replying to a particular post entails users referencing another
post number N by adding >>N in their post, and the standard
UIs then treat it as a reply. This is different from simply post-
ing in a thread: users are directly replying to a specific post
(not necessarily the post the OP started the thread with), with
the caveat that one can reply to the same post multiple times
and to multiple posts at the same time.
We look at this reply functionality in 4chan to assess how
engaged users are with each other. First, we find that 50-
60% of posts never receive a direct reply across all three
boards (/int/: 49%, /pol/: 57%, /sp/: 60%). Taking the posts
with no replies into account, we see that on average /pol/
(0.83) and /int/ (0.80) have many more replies per post than
/sp/ (0.64), however, the standard deviation on /pol/ is much
higher (/pol/: 2.55, /int/: 1.29, /sp/: 1.25).
We also observe substantial differences in the distribution
of the mean replies received per post, per country, although
we omit details due to lack of space. On average, while
/pol/ posts are likely to receive more replies than /sp/ and
/int/ posts, the distribution is heavily skewed towards certain
countries. Although deeper analysis of these differences is
beyond the scope of this paper, we highlight that, for some
of the countries, the “rare flag” mememay be responsible for
receiving more replies. I.e., users will respond to a post by an
uncommonly seen flag. For other countries, e.g., Turkey or
Israel, it might be the case that these are either of particular
interest to /pol/, or are quite adept at trolling /pol/ into replies
(we note that our dataset covers the 2016 Turkish coup at-
tempt and /pol/ has a love/hate relationship with Israel).
Finally, we note that, unlike many other social media plat-
forms, there is no other interaction system applied to posts
on 4chan besides replies (e.g., no liking, upvoting, starring,
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Figure 8: Distribution of different categories of URLs posted
in /pol/, together with the Alexa ranking of their domain.
etc.). Thus, the only way for a user to receive validation from
(or really any sort of direct interaction with) other users is to
entice them to reply, which might encourage users to craft
as inflammatory or controversial posts as possible.
Analyzing Content
In this section, we present an exploratory analysis of the
content posted on /pol/. First, we analyze the types of me-
dia (links and images) shared on the board, then, we study
the use of hate words, and show how /pol/ users can be clus-
tered into meaningful geo-political regions via the wording
of their posts.
Media Analysis
Links. As expected, we find that /pol/ users often post links
to external content, e.g., to share and comment on news and
events. (As we discuss later, they also do so to identify and
coordinate targets for hate attacks on other platforms.) To
study the nature of the URLs posted on /pol/, we use McAfee
SiteAdvisor,3 which, given a URL, returns its category –
e.g., “Entertainment” or “Social Networking.” We also mea-
sure the popularity of the linked websites, using Alexa rank-
ing.4 Figure 8 plots the distribution of categories of URLs
posted in /pol/, showing that “Streaming Media” and “Me-
dia Sharing” are the most common, with YouTube playing
a key role. Interestingly, for some categories, URLs mostly
belong to very popular domains, while others, e.g., “General
News,” include a large number of less popular sites.
3https://www.siteadvisor.com/
4http://www.alexa.com/
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Figure 10: Percentage of posts on /pol/
the top 15 most popular hate words ap-
pear in.
Cluster Terms
1: trump, nigger, american, jew, women, latinos, spanish
2: turkey, coup, erdogan, muslim, syria, assad, kurd
3: russia, trump, war, jew, muslim, putin, nato
4: india, muslim, pakistan, women, trump, arab, islam
5: jew, israel, trump, black, nigger, christian, muslim
6: women, nigger, trump, german, america, western, asian
7: trump, women, muslim, nigger, jew, german, eu, immigr
8: trump, white, black, hillari, nigger, jew, women, american
Figure 11: World map colored by content
analysis based clustering.
The website most linked to on /pol/ is YouTube, with
over an order of magnitude more URLs posted than the next
two sites, Wikipedia and Twitter, followed by Archive.is, a
site that lets users take on-demand “snapshots” of a web-
site, which is often used on /pol/ to record content – e.g.,
tweets, blog posts, or news stories – users feel might get
deleted. The 5th and 6th most popular domains are Wik-
ileaks and pastebin, followed by DonaldJTrump.com. Next,
news sites start appearing, including the DailyMail and Bre-
itbart, which are right-wing leaning news outlets. It is inter-
esting to observe that some of the most popular news sites
on a global level, e.g., CNN, BBC, and The Guardian, ap-
pear well outside the top-10 most common domains. On a
board like /pol/, which is meant to focus on politics and cur-
rent events, this underlines the polarization of opinions ex-
pressed by its users.
Images. 4chan was designed as an imageboard site, where
users share images along with a message. Therefore, al-
though some content will naturally be “reposted” (in fact,
memes are almost by definition going to be posted numer-
ous times (Ferrara et al. 2013)), we expect /pol/ to generate
large amounts of original content. To this end, we count the
number of unique images posted on /pol/ during our ob-
servation period, finding 1,003,785 unique images (almost
800GB) out of a total 2,210,972 images (45%). We also plot
the CCDF of the number of posts in which each unique im-
age appears, using the image hash (obtained from the JSON
API) as a unique identifier, in Figure 9. Although the plot is
only a lower bound on image reuse (it only captures exact re-
posts), we note that the majority (about 70%) of images are
only posted once, and nearly 95% nomore than 5 times. That
said, there is a very long tail, i.e., a few select images become
what we might deem “successful memes.” This is line with
4chan’s reputation for creating memes, and a meme is such
only if it is seen many times. Indeed, the most popular image
on /pol/ appears 838 times in our dataset, depicting what we
might consider the least rare “Pepe.” Note that the Pepe the
Frog meme was recently declared a hate symbol by the Anti-
Defamation League (Anti-Defamation League 2016), but of
the 10 Pepe images appearing in the top 25 most popular
images on /pol/, none seem to have an obvious link to hate.
Even with a conservative estimation, we find that /pol/
users posted over 1M unique images in 2.5 months, the ma-
jority of which were either original content or sourced from
outside /pol/. This seems to confirm that the constant produc-
tion of new content may be one of the reasons /pol/ is at the
heart of the hate movement on the Internet (Siegel 2015).
Text Analysis
Hate speech. /pol/ is generally considered a “hateful”
ecosystem, however, quantifying hate is a non-trivial task.
One possible approach is to perform sentiment analy-
sis (Pang and Lee 2008) over the posts in order to identify
positive vs. negative attitude, but this is difficult since the
majority of /pol/ posts (about 84%) are either neutral or neg-
ative. As a consequence, to identify hateful posts we use the
hatebase dictionary, a crowdsourced list of more than 1,000
terms from around the world that indicate hate when refer-
ring to a third person.5 We also use the NLTK framework6
to identify these words in various forms (e.g., “retard” vs
“retarded”). Our dictionary-based approach identifies posts
that contain hateful terms, but there might be cases where
the context might not exactly be “hateful” (e.g., ironic us-
age). Moreover, hatebase is a crowdsourced database, and is
not perfect. To this end, we manually examine the list and
remove a few of the words that are clearly ambiguous or
extremely context-sensitive (e.g., “india” is a variant of “in-
dio,” used in Mexico to refer to someone of Afro-Mexican
origin, but is likely to be a false positive confused with the
country India in our dataset). Nevertheless, given the nature
of /pol/, the vast majority of posts likely use these terms in a
hateful manner.
Despite these caveats, we can use this approach to pro-
vide an idea of how prevalent hate speech is on /pol/. We
find that 12% of /pol/ posts contain hateful terms, which
is substantially higher than in /sp/ (6.3%) and /int/ (7.3%).
In comparison, analyzing our sample of tweets reveals just
how substantially different /pol/ is from other social media:
only 2.2% contained a hate word. In Figure 10, we also re-
port the percentage of /pol/ posts in which the top 15 most
“popular” hate words from the hatebase dictionary appear.
“Nigger” is the most popular hate word, used in more than
2% of posts, while “faggot” and “retard” appear in over 1%
of posts. To get an idea of the magnitude of hate, consider
that “nigger” appears in 265K posts, i.e., about 120 posts an
hour. After the top 3 hate words, there is a sharp drop in us-
age, although we see a variety of slurs. These include “goy,”
5https://www.hatebase.org
6http://www.nltk.org
which is a derogatory word used by Jewish people to refer
to non-Jewish people. In our experience, however, we note
that “goy” is used in an inverted fashion on /pol/, i.e., posters
call other posters “goys” to imply that they are submitting to
Jewish “manipulation” and “trickery.”
Country Analysis. Next, we explored how hate speech dif-
fers by country. We observe clear differences in the use of
hate speech, ranging from around 4.15% (e.g., in Indonesia,
Arab countries, etc.) to around 30% of posts (e.g., China,
Bahamas, Cyprus), while the majority of the 239 countries
in our dataset feature hate speech in 8%–12% of their posts.
Note that some of the most “hateful” countries (e.g., Ba-
hamas and Zimbabwe) might be overrepresented due to the
use of proxies in those countries. Zimbabwe is of particular
interest to /pol/ users because of its history as the unrecog-
nized state of Rhodesia.
To understand whether the country flag has any meaning,
we run a term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-
IDF) analysis to identify topics that are used per country.
We remove all countries that have less than 1,000 posts, as
this eliminates the most obvious potential proxy locations.
After removing stop words and performing stemming, we
build TF-IDF vectors for each of the remaining 98 countries,
representing the frequencies with which different words are
used, but down-weighted by the general frequency of each
word across all countries. When examining the TF-IDF vec-
tors, although we cannot definitively exclude the presence of
proxied users, we see that the majority of posts from coun-
tries seem to match geographically, e.g., posters from the US
talk about Trump and the elections more than posters from
South America, users in the UK talk about Brexit, those from
Greece about the economic and immigration crisis, and peo-
ple from Turkey about the attempted coup in July 2016.
Clustering. To provide more evidence for the conclusion
that /pol/ is geo-politically diverse, we perform some ba-
sic text classification and evaluate whether or not different
parts of the world are talking about “similar” topics. We ap-
ply spectral clustering over the vectors using the Eigengap
heuristic (Ng et al. 2002) to automatically identify the num-
ber of target clusters. In Figure 11, we present a world map
colored according to the 8 clusters generated. Indeed, we
see the formation of geo-political “blocks.” Most of Western
Europe is clustered together, and so are USA and Canada,
while the Balkans are in a cluster with Russia. One possi-
ble limitation stemming from our spectral clustering is its
sensitivity to the total number of countries we are attempt-
ing to cluster. Indeed, we find that, by filtering out fewer
countries based on number of posts, the clusters do change.
For instance, if we do not filter any country out, France is
clustered with former French colonies and territories, Spain
with South America, and a few of the Nordic countries flip
between the Western Europe and the North American clus-
ters. Additionally, while /pol/ posts are almost exclusively in
English, certain phrasings, misspellings, etc. from non na-
tive speakers might also influence the clustering. That said,
the overall picture remains consistent: the flags associated
with /pol/ posts are meaningful in terms of the topics those
posts talk about.
Raids Against Other Services
As discussed previously, /pol/ is often used to post links to
other sites: some are posted to initiate discussion or pro-
vide additional commentary, but others serve to call /pol/
users to certain coordinated actions, including attempts to
skew post-debate polls (Couts and Powell 2016) as well as
“raids” (Alfonso 2014).
Broadly speaking, a raid is an attempt to disrupt another
site, not from a network perspective (as in a DDoS attack),
but from a content point of view. I.e., raids are not an at-
tempt to directly attack a 3rd party service itself, but rather
to disrupt the community that calls that service home. Raids
on /pol/ are semi-organized: we anecdotally observe a num-
ber of calls for action (Bernstein et al. 2011) consisting of a
link to a target – e.g., a YouTube video or a Twitter hashtag –
and the text “you know what to do,” prompting other 4chan
users to start harassing the target. The thread itself often be-
comes an aggregation point with screenshots of the target’s
reaction, sharing of sock puppet accounts used to harass, etc.
In this section, we study how raids on YouTube work.
We show that synchronization between /pol/ threads and
YouTube comments is correlated with an increase in hate
speech in the YouTube comments. We further show evidence
that the synchronization is correlated with a high degree of
overlap in YouTube commenters.
Spreading Hate on YouTube
As discussed in our literature review, we still have limited
insight into how trolls operate, and in particular how forces
outside the control of targeted services organize and coordi-
nate their actions. To this end, we set out to investigate the
connection between /pol/ threads and YouTube comments.
We focus on YouTube since 1) it accounts for the major-
ity of media links posted on /pol/, and 2) it is experienc-
ing an increase in hateful comments, prompting Google to
announce the (not uncontroversial) YouTube Heroes pro-
gram (YouTube Official Blog 2016).
We examine the comments from 19,568 YouTube videos
linked to by 10,809 /pol/ threads to look for raiding behav-
ior at scale. Note that finding evidence of raids on YouTube
(or any other service) is not an easy task, considering that ex-
plicit calls for raids are an offense that can get users banned.7
Therefore, rather than looking for a particular trigger on
/pol/, we look for elevated activity in comments on YouTube
videos linked from /pol/. In a nutshell, we expect raids to
exhibit synchronized activity between comments in a /pol/
thread a YouTube link appears in and the amount of com-
ments it receives on YouTube. We also expect the rate of
hateful comments to increase after a link is posted on /pol/.
Activity Modeling
To model synchronized activities, we use signal process-
ing techniques. First, we introduce some notation: Let x
be a /pol/ thread, and y the set of comments to a YouTube
video linked from x. We denote with
{
tix|i = 1, ..Nx
}
and
7Recall that, since there are no accounts on 4chan, bans are based
on session/cookies or IP addresses/ranges, with the latter causing
VPN/proxies to be banned often.
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Figure 12: Distribution of the distance (in normalized thread
lifetime) of the highest peak of activity in YouTube com-
ments and the /pol/ thread they appear in. t = 0 denotes
the time when video was first mentioned, and t = 1 the last
related post in the thread.
{
tjy|j = 1, ..Ny
}
, respectively, the set of timestamps of
posts in x and y. Since the lifetime of /pol/ threads is quite
dynamic, we shift and normalize the time axis for both
{
tix
}
and
{
tjy
}
, so that t = 0 corresponds to when the video was
first linked and t = 1 to the last post in the /pol/ thread:
t←
t− tyt
tlast − tyt
.
In other words, we normalize to the duration of the /pol/
thread’s lifetime. We consider only /pol/ posts that occur
after the YouTube mention, while, for computational com-
plexity reasons, we consider only YouTube comments that
occurred within the (normalized) [−10,+10] period, which
accounts for 35% of YouTube comments in our dataset.
From the list of YouTube comment timestamps,
we compute the corresponding Probability Density
Function (PDF) using the Kernel Density Estimator
method (Silverman 1986), and estimate the position of the
absolute maximum of the distribution. In Figure 12, we
plot the distribution of the distance between the highest
peak in YouTube commenting activity and the /pol/ post
linking to the video. We observe that 14% of the YouTube
videos experience a peak in activity during the period they
are discussed on /pol/. In many cases, /pol/ seems to have
a strong influence on YouTube activity, suggesting that
the YouTube link posted on /pol/ might have a triggering
behavior, even though this analysis does not necessarily
provide evidence of a raid taking place.
However, if a raid is taking place, then the comments on
both /pol/ and YouTube are likely to be “synchronized.” Con-
sider, for instance, the extreme case where some users that
see the YouTube link on a /pol/ thread comment on both
YouTube and and the /pol/ thread simultaneously: the two
set of timestamps would be perfectly synchronized. In prac-
tice, we measure the synchronization, in terms of delay be-
tween activities, using cross-correlation to estimate the lag
between two signals. In practice, cross-correlation slides one
signal with respect to the other and calculates the dot product
(i.e., the matching) between the two signals for each pos-
sible lag. The estimated lag is the one that maximizes the
matching between the signals. We represent the sequences as
signals (x(t) and y(t)), using Dirac delta distributions δ(·).
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Figure 13: Hateful YouTube comments vs synchronization
lag between /pol/ threads and corresponding YouTube com-
ments. Each point is a /pol/ thread. The hateful comments
count refers to just those within the thread lifetime ([0,+1])
Specifically, we expand x(t) and y(t) into trains of Dirac
delta distributions:
x(t) =
Nx∑
i=1
δ
(
t− t
i
x
)
; y(t) =
Ny∑
j=1
δ
(
t− t
j
y
)
and we calculate c(t), the continuous time cross-correlation
between the two series8 as:
c(t) =
∫
∞
−∞
x(t+ τ)y(τ)dτ =
Nx∑
i=1
Ny∑
j=1
δ
(
t−
(
t
j
y − t
i
x
))
The resulting cross-correlation is also a Dirac delta train,
representing the set of all possible inter-arrival times be-
tween elements from the two sets.
If y(t) is the version of x(t) shifted by ∆T (or at least
contains a shifted version of x(t)), with each sample delayed
with a slightly different time lag, c(t) will be characterized
by a high concentration of pulses around∆T . As in the peak
activity detection, we can estimate the more likely lag by
computing the associated PDF function cˆ(t) by means of
the Kernel Density Estimator method (Silverman 1986), and
then compute the global maximum:
cˆ(t) =
∫
∞
−∞
c(t+ τ)k(τ)dτ ; ∆ˆT = argmax
t
cˆ(t)
where k(t) is the kernel smoothing function (typically a
zero-mean Gaussian function).9
Evidence of Raids
Building on the above insights, we provide large-scale evi-
dence of raids. If a raid is taking place, we expect the esti-
mated lag ∆T to be close to zero, and we can validate this
by looking at the content of the YouTube comments.
Figure 13 plots the relationship between the number of
hateful comments on YouTube that occur within the /pol/
thread lifetime (i.e., containing at least one word from the
hatebase dictionary) and the synchronization lag between
the /pol/ thread and the YouTube comments. The trend is
8Since timestamp resolution is 1s, this is equivalent to a discrete-
time cross-correlation with 1s binning, but the closed form solu-
tion lets us compute it much more efficiently.
9cˆ(t) is also the cross-correlation between the PDF functions re-
lated to x(t) and y(t).
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Figure 14: CDF of synchronization lag between /pol/ threads
and YouTube comments, distinguishing between threads
with YouTube videos containing higher hate comments per-
centage in the [0 +1] period or [-1 0].
quite clear: as the rate of hateful comments on YouTube in-
creases, the synchronization lag between /pol/ and YouTube
comments decreases. This shows that almost all YouTube
videos affected by (detected) hateful comments during the
/pol/ thread lifetime are likely related to raids.
Figure 14 plots the CDF of the absolute value of the
synchronization lag between /pol/ threads and comments on
the corresponding YouTube videos. We distinguish between
comments with a higher percentage of comments contain-
ing hate words during the life of the thread from those
with more before the thread. In other words, we compare
threads where /pol/ appears to have a negative impact vs.
those where they do not. From the plot, we observe that the
YouTube comments with more hate speech during the /pol/
thread’s lifetime are significantly (p < 0.01 with a 2-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) more synchronized with the /pol/
thread itself.
Finally, to further show that /pol/ is raiding YouTube
videos, we can look at the authors of YouTube comments.
We argue that, unlike the anonymous venue of /pol/, raids on
a service like YouTube will leave evidence via account us-
age, and that the same raiding YouTube accounts will likely
be used by /pol/ users more than once. Indeed, while it is
moderately easy to create a new YouTube account, there is
still some effort involved. Troll accounts might also be cul-
tivated for use over time, gaining some reputation as they go
along. Perhaps more importantly, while less anonymous than
/pol/, YouTube accounts are still only identified by a profile
name and do not truly reveal the identity of the user.
To measure this, we compute the overlap (Jaccard index)
of commenters in each YouTube video. In Figure 15 we plot
the synchronization lag as a function of the maximum over-
lap between a given video and all others. From the figure we
observe that if a YouTube video has relatively high overlap
with at least one other YouTube video, it also highly syn-
chronized with its corresponding /pol/ thread, indicative of a
raid taking place.
Discussion & Conclusion
This paper presented the first large-scale study of /pol/,
4chan’s politically incorrect board, arguably the most con-
troversial one owing to its links to the alt-right movement
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Figure 15: Maximum Jaccard Index of a YouTube video and
all others vs synchronization lag between /pol/ threads and
corresponding YouTube comments. Note the high correla-
tion between overlap and synchronization lag.
and its unconventional support to Donald Trump’s 2016
presidential campaign. First, we provided a general charac-
terization, comparing activity on /pol/ to two other boards on
4chan, /sp/ (“sports”) and /int/ (“international”). We showed
that each of the boards exhibits different behaviors with re-
spect to thread creation and posts. We looked at the impact
of “bump limits” on discourse, finding that it results in fresh
content on a consistent basis. We used the country flag fea-
ture present on the three boards and found that, while Amer-
icans dominate the conversation in terms of absolute num-
bers, many other countries (both native English speaking
and not) are well represented in terms of posts per capita.
We also showed differences in the maturity of threads with
respect to moderators’ actions across the boards.
Next, we examined the content posted to /pol/, finding that
the majority of links posted to the board point to YouTube.
We also saw that /pol/ contains many more links to tabloid
and right-wing leaning news outlets than mainstream sites.
By looking at metadata associated with posted images, we
learned that most content on 4chan is quite unique: 70%
of the 1M unique images in our dataset were posted only
once and 95% less than 5 times. In fact, /pol/’s ability to find
or produce original content is likely one of the reasons it is
thought to be at the center of hate on the web.
Finally, we studied “raiding” behavior by looking for ev-
idence of /pol/’s hateful impact on YouTube comments. We
used signal processing techniques to discover that peaks of
commenting activity on YouTube tend to occur within the
lifetime of the thread they were posted to on /pol/. Next,
we used cross-correlation to estimate the synchronization
lag between /pol/ threads and comments on linked YouTube
videos. Here, we found that as the synchronization lag ap-
proaches zero, there is an increase in the rate of comments
with hate words on the linked YouTube comments. Finally,
we saw that if two YouTube videos’ comments had many
common authors they were likely to be highly synchronized,
indicating potential raider accounts. This evidence suggests
that, while not necessarily explicitly called for (and in fact,
against /pol/’s rules), /pol/ users are performing raids in an
attempt to disrupt the community of YouTube users.
Overall, our analysis provides not only the first mea-
surement study of /pol/, but also insight into the continued
growth of hate and extremism trends on social media, and
prompts a few interesting problems for future research. Nat-
urally, however, our work is not without limitations. First,
although the Hatebase dataset we used is an invaluable re-
source for hate speech analysis, the usage of “hate” words
may be context-dependent, and we leave it to future work to
investigate how to distinguish context (e.g., by recognizing
sarcasm or trolling). Also, our flag based country analysis
may have been influenced by the use of VPNs/proxies: al-
though this does not affect the validity of our results, it calls
for a more in-depth analysis of language and posting behav-
ior. Finally, while we showed quantitative evidence that raids
are taking place, we do not claim an ability to classify them
as there are many layers of subtlety in how raiding behavior
might be exhibited. However, we are confident that our find-
ings can serve as a foundation for interesting and valuable
future work exploring fringe groups like the alt-right, hate
speech, and online harassment campaigns.
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